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persuasive ironies: utopian readings  
of swift and krasicki
Katarzyna Bartoszyńska
The ostensible goal of the utopian novel is to serve as the fictional 
 embodiment of a theoretical ideal, the dream of a perfect society brought to 
life. This is especially true in the age of Enlightenment, a time that seemed 
to particularly believe in the emancipatory power of reason and its ability to 
rationally organize human existence. The novel is an obvious handmaiden 
to the utopian project, rendering the brave new world tangible and familiar 
while also acting as its advocate, persuading readers of its virtues. It seems 
surprising, then, to find two eighteenth-century utopian novels that not 
only critique utopian ideals but also call into question fiction’s ability to 
deliver utopianism’s message, or indeed, any kind of lesson at all. Yet the 
two novels I discuss in this article, Jonathan Swift’s Gulliver’s Travels (1726) 
and Ignacy Krasicki’s Mikołaja Doświadczyńskiego przypadki (The Adventures 
of Mr. Nicholas Wisdom) (1776), do exactly that. Krasicki and Swift illustrate 
the ultimate disjunction between the human and the abstract, a problem 
that is at the heart of political theory itself. The inability of the universal to 
meaningfully encompass the individual casts doubt on political projects of 
universal freedom, which must ultimately be a freedom of the individual, 
and of self-determination. What makes their novels of particular interest 
is the way in which they simultaneously illuminate the limits of fiction’s 
powers of political pedagogy and its ability to portray those limits through 
its use of irony.
Mikołaja Doświadczyńskiego przypadki is often considered to be the first 
Polish novel, and a typical text of the Enlightenment. The novel tells the 
story of a young man, Mikołaj, and his upbringing in Sarmatian Poland. 
Forced to leave the country because of financial problems, he travels to 
France, which he must also eventually flee because of money troubles. 
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A shipwreck lands him on the island of Nipu, which most critics read as 
a fairly straightforward embodiment of Enlightenment principles, in line 
with other European visions of utopia.1 After leaving Nipu, Mikołaj travels 
to the New World, and ultimately returns to Poland. Studies of the novel 
focus on its advocacy of Enlightenment values (though more recent criti-
cism has begun to complicate this picture, as Teresa Kostkiewiczowa points 
out in a broad overview of this issue), but as I make clear here, the novel 
lends itself to a very different reading.2 Swift was undeniably an influence 
on Krasicki: in fact, the narrator of Krasicki’s subsequent novel, Historia, is 
a character from Gulliver’s Travels, an immortal Strudlbrug from Luggnag, 
of Gulliver’s third voyage. Read alongside Gulliver’s Travels, the critique of 
Enlightenment values in Mikołaja Doświadczyńskiego przypadki becomes far 
more apparent. Both novels not only articulate a similar problematic at the 
heart of utopian thought but also reflect more specifically on the role that 
fiction plays in illuminating these critiques.
At the center of both texts is an interrogation of the disjunct between 
theory and practice, between the particular and the universal. The universal 
has, of course, long been a problem for utopian thought, particularly for its 
fictional representations. The universal as a category is necessarily abstract and 
formal in nature: if it is to contain everyone, it cannot be too particular. But this 
is precisely what cripples the fictional efforts: the category becomes so broad 
that it loses sight of the individual. Fredric Jameson complains, for instance, 
that in utopian literature “the perspective is utterly anonymous. The citizens 
of utopia are grasped as a statistical population; there are no  individuals any 
longer, let alone any existential ‘lived experience.’”3 The characters become 
a uniform, undifferentiated mass, no longer  recognizable as human. It is 
a curious conundrum, for this is the very problem that fiction ought to 
ameliorate, rendering the experience of utopian life tangible.  Moreover, this 
tendency to paint humanity in its elementary forms also opens onto the 
dangers inherent in utopian planning; the slippage into  totalitarianism that 
is so common in these works. To lose sight of the individual, it seems, is also 
to lose sight of the cost of human life. Utopias, by virtue of being “perfect,” 
are singular entities that struggle to accommodate pluralism.
As a problem, this difficulty in depicting individuals in universal terms—
and universals in individual terms—becomes a fascinating manifestation 
of the disjunction between the human and the theoretical. The intriguing 
aspect of Swift’s and Krasicki’s texts is that they make this issue central to 
their novels, turning them into reflections on the problem as such. Their 
works actively grapple with, and comment on, the difficulties inherent in the 
encounter between abstraction and reality, theory and practice.
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This disjunction between abstraction and reality also lies at the center 
of the paradox of travel literature, a subgenre that has particularly strong ties 
to utopian fiction. Travel writing is an obvious model for utopian literature: 
the structure of travel narrative offers the perfect justification for devoting so 
much attention and detail to the inner workings of a fictional society (indeed, 
the premise of the utopian novel practically requires an audience conceived 
of as foreign, for why else would the descriptions be necessary?). But here the 
paradox takes hold: as a genre, travel literature attempts to deliver virtually 
what it simultaneously insists must be experienced personally—the experi-
ence of travel. This contradiction is made particularly explicit when authors 
complain about the damage wreaked by other travel narratives that have been 
propagating false information about a given locale and argue vehemently that 
literature is not to be trusted. These are works that insistently privilege lived 
reality over abstract—or literary—knowledge, simultaneously attempting to 
make the experience of reading a novel akin to the act of travel and protesting 
the impossibility of their task.
Many texts simply ignore this paradox and take it as given that their 
work will not suffer from such flaws. They acknowledge the problem and 
proceed as if their own accounts are faultless, because at very least they have 
shown themselves as conscientious and aware of the potential dangers that 
lie ahead. The narrator in Krasicki’s later novel, Historia, is a representative 
example: he not only makes a point of correcting stereotypes about the places 
he visits but also derides written histories and warns readers never to trust 
official accounts.4 In other words, he dives into paradox with hardly a back-
ward glance: historical narratives are unreliable and their misleading accounts 
have dangerous effects, but his own work can be relied on to provide a faithful 
account. In Gulliver’s Travels and Mikołaja Doświadczyńskiego przypadki, Swift 
and Krasicki treat the issue in somewhat more complex ways, using travel 
writing’s inherent problematic as an opening onto the broader question of the 
clash between abstraction and reality and what it means for utopian thought.
Pedagogies of Travel
Early on in Gulliver’s Travels, Swift shows Gulliver to be simultaneously 
aware of the virtues of travel—its ability to educate and enlighten—and 
immune to its effects. When his description of England to the king of 
Brobdingag is met with horror, Gulliver’s own faith in his homeland is not 
shaken. Rather, he says,
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But great allowances should be given to a King who lives wholly 
secluded from the rest of the world, and must therefore be altogether 
unacquainted with the manners and customs that most prevail in 
other nations: the want of which knowledge will ever produce many 
prejudices and certain narrowness of thinking; from which we and the 
politer countries of Europe are wholly exempted.5
The potential wisdom to be gained from a journey lies in its ability to unsettle 
one’s views, leading to the acknowledgment of a different  perspective. 
Gulliver, unable to distance himself mentally from the politics of his home 
and recognize them as flawed, can readily dismiss the king’s view precisely 
because the king has not traveled widely, never mind the fact that Gulliver’s 
own voyages have served only to reinforce previously held beliefs. The irony 
here is readily discernible and makes it quite clear that simply going to a 
different place does not automatically confer wisdom on the traveler.
Mikołaja Doświadczyńskiego przypadki takes a different approach, though 
a similarly problematic one. Mikołaj, in an encounter reminiscent of that 
between Gulliver and the king of Brobdingag, takes the criticisms to heart, 
even if he is not fully persuaded. Rather than attributing the disagreement 
to his companion’s lack of travel, Mikołaj is impressed by his friend’s wisdom 
despite this lack:
Upokarzał mnie rozum Xaoo; nie mogłem tego skombinować, jak to 
człowiek, który w Warszawie nigdy nie był, Paryża nie widział, mógł 
przecię rozsądnie myślić, mówić i konwinkować nawet człowieka, 
który nierównie więcej od niego i widział, i słyszał.
(Xaoo’s reasoning humbled me. I could not fathom how a person who 
had not been to Warsaw and had not seen Paris was able nonetheless 
to think and speak sensibly and to be convincing, even in  conversation 
with someone who had both seen and heard incomparably more 
than he).6
Here, Mikołaj simultaneously illustrates the merits of travel—allowing one 
to encounter others whose ideas may be persuasive—and also implies that 
it is not necessary, for after all, Xaoo has attained this wisdom without ever 
leaving home. Perhaps it is simply a matter of reading the right books after 
all? Travel, in these two scenes, is shown as either insufficient or unnecessary: 
hardly a glowing endorsement for the genre of travel writing.
This content downloaded from 139.179.72.98 on Tue, 24 Jul 2018 12:46:43 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
622 C O M PA R AT I V E  L I T E R AT U R E  S T U D I E S
Mikołaj’s further adventures deepen the problem. The novel can be read 
as a narrative of conversion (or education), whereby Mikołaj moves from 
naiveté to wisdom as he learns about the world. The most obvious marker 
of change in the protagonist is in his attitude toward money. In the early 
portions of the text, most of Mikołaj’s problems are of a financial nature, 
and his desire for money threatens to destroy him. When he arrives at the 
island of Nipu, he is seemingly educated out of this love for gold until he 
discovers a shipwreck that contains, among other things, a pile of treasure. 
It is here that we see the limits of abstract intellectual argument, for despite 
his better judgment, he simply cannot resist the allure of money, the very 
thing that nearly ruined him in the first place:
Złoto, lubo w tej wyspie do niczego niezdatne, ułudziło mnie zupełnie. 
Stałem się chciwym bez nadziei zysków, trwożnym w zupełnym 
bezpieczeństwie. . . . Jużem się był przyzwyczaił do sposobu życia 
Nipuanów; jużem zaczynał doznawać skutków szacownej spokojności. 
Kruszec złoty nie dość że mnie uczynił nieszczęśliwym w Europie, 
dognał za światem. . . . [W]idząc, że się żadnym sposobem 
przezwyciężyć nie mogę, przedsięwziąłem na owej zachowanej 
z okrętu łodzi puścić się na zgubę oczewistą prawie, byle z tej wyspy 
wynieść. (140–41)
(The gold, though valueless on Nipu, had utterly beguiled me. 
I became greedy without hope of profit, and I felt anxious while 
enjoying complete security. . . . I had actually grown accustomed to 
the Nipuan way of life. I had begun to value the sacred tranquility 
of the place. But that metal known as gold was not content to make 
me miserable in Europe alone; it now pursued me the world over. . . . 
Realizing that I could not prevail over myself, I resolved to leave 
the island in the boat I had salvaged from the wrecked ship, even 
though I was almost certain that this would bring about my ruin. 
[101, translation modified])
Although greed and the desire for luxury are faults explicitly derided by 
the Nipuans, and although Mikołaj seems to agree with their teachings on 
an abstract level and enjoy a world without money, when confronted with 
the glint of gold he is overwhelmed by what even he can recognize as an 
irrational desire. He flees the island without a word of goodbye, as though 
he were escaping a prison instead of a paradise. Although he will later claim 
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that it was patriotism and a yearning for home that led to his departure, the 
baser motive is far more credible. Clearly, abstract knowledge can only go 
so far: human caprice is far more powerful.
He eventually frees himself of his greed once and for all, but the means 
of his conversion is not rational discourse of the sort he had been exposed to 
in Nipu: after leaving Nipu he is enslaved and forced to work in the mines, 
which leads to a painful awareness about where wealth comes from and 
the suffering it causes. If the lovers of gold were made aware of how much 
suffering people undergo to provide them with this metal, he argues, they 
would change their ways (151/110). Although he quickly converts his suffering 
into a life lesson via abstract reasoning, it is clear that it is the physical pain 
that has changed his mind, again casting doubt on the power of literature 
to deliver, in writing, lessons that are bought with experience.
One could say that the problem is not literature and whatever powers 
it may possess but rather human nature. Indeed, Mikołaj is practically a 
poster child for human intractability. Despite myriad educational experi-
ences, he repeatedly reverts back to his previous beliefs and must be trained 
out of them anew. This is most clear in his persistent tendency to stereo-
type people. For example, his initial encounters with the Nipuans lead him 
to think they are a rather primitive race, and he decides that he can best 
express his gratitude for their hospitality by making them aware of their 
own barbarism. As he is on the verge of doing so, however, they turn the 
tables, praising his progress in becoming more civilized and adapting to 
Nipuan culture (93–94/66–67). He is thunderstruck with astonishment, 
and so begins the novel’s long-running critique of developmental notions 
of human civilization. I return to the political implications of this aspect 
of the text later, but for the moment, its relevance is to illustrate Mikołaj’s 
stubborn immunity to any form of education. Although he does ultimately 
recognize that the Nipuans are not savage, this fails to translate into a 
broader cultural relativism or even to an increased self-awareness of his own 
assumptions about others. When he arrives in the New World and a tribal 
native offers him assistance, Mikołaj declares himself “zdziwiony takowym 
procederem dzikiego człowieka” (152) (“surprised that a savage would act 
in such a manner” [111]). The irony of the scene is not lost on the reader, 
particularly because the “native” immediately offers a lengthy disquisition 
on the topic, which is later repeated by the Margrave de Vennes. Not only 
does Mikołaj need to be reminded of it again by the Margrave; upon hearing 
it, he remarks that he is surprised to hear such profound ideas from a man 
who looks, at first glance, like a dandy—launching the Margrave into yet 
another lecture.
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The novel thus finds itself in a somewhat paradoxical position, striving to 
educate its readers at the same time that it attempts to illustrate the  limitations 
of abstract argument. While Krasicki shows that reasoned discourse cannot 
guarantee a lasting transformation in his protagonist, he seems to retain some 
faith that, if repeated often enough, it may ultimately convert his readers. 
The novel therefore attempts to form its claims in a dual fashion: not only 
by abstract argument but also through vicarious experience. While the reader 
cannot be made to work in the gold mines, for instance, he can, perhaps, be 
moved through fiction to a new understanding. The power of such a plea, 
however, is ambiguous at best and is dependent on the extent to which the 
reader can identify with Mikołaj and his experiences. At the same time, 
Mikołaj is also clearly a negative example in some cases, whom the narrator 
is gently mocking for his narrow-mindedness and inability to learn.7 Thus, 
the novel must likewise contain long passages of didactic screed (delivered 
by other characters) to set the reader on the correct path. In other words, 
the novel simultaneously asks the reader to identify with the protagonist and 
read him ironically. This is precisely the paradox of travel writing and, more 
broadly, the problem at the heart of literature’s pedagogical potential: it has 
two strategies of persuasion, and they are at odds with each other.
The Citizens of Utopia
Mikołaj’s resistance to rational argument underscores a fundamental problem 
with the utopian premise: the recalcitrance of human nature. The utopian 
dream is based upon the ability of humans to lead a rationally organized 
existence, but as Mikołaj’s adventures—and the end of the novel—make 
clear, it is not always possible to persuade people to do what is good for them. 
And yet this is precisely what utopian fiction strives to do, and indeed must 
do, for the citizens of utopia must be committed to the principles on which 
it is founded. What then, are we to make of a utopian novel that illustrates 
the impossibility of convincing someone via abstract argument?
While the conclusion of the work speaks to the difficulties in persuading 
people to change their own system of government to a superior one—to enact 
a utopia—it cannot be ignored that Mikołaj was not banished from Nipu but 
left of his own volition, and for wholly irrational reasons. The problem in this 
case is not only how to convince people to create a utopian world but also how 
to persuade them to stay put once they have one. As Krasicki shows, this is a 
difficult proposition, for human nature is fickle. Swift  likewise speaks of such 
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human caprice: describing the island of Laputa in the third voyage, Gulliver 
notes that travel is strictly regulated, for the female inhabitants would other-
wise flee. While this may be read as simple Swiftian misogyny (Frank Boyle, 
referring specifically to this episode, offers a defense against this charge), it 
nonetheless further speaks to the impossibility of a rationally organized life:8
The wives and daughters lament their confinement to the island, 
although I think it is the most delicious spot of ground in the world; 
and although they live here in the greatest plenty and magnificence, 
and are allowed to do whatever they please, they long to see the 
world, and take the diversions of the metropolis, which they are not 
allowed to do without particular license from the King; and this is 
not easy to be obtained, because the people of quality have found by 
frequent experience how hard it is to persuade their women to return 
from below. (155–56)
Here, we see again the irrational desire to leave “the most delicious spot of 
ground in the world,” even for a life of misery. Although Gulliver deduces 
from this that “the caprices of womankind are not limited by any climate or 
nation, and that they are more uniform than can be easily imagined” (156), one 
cannot help but notice that Gulliver himself is cursed with a similar capri-
cious wanderlust; “the thirst I had of seeing the world, notwithstanding my 
past misfortunes, continuing as violent as ever” (143), “my insatiable desire of 
seeing foreign countries” (67), “I continued at home with my wife and children 
about five months in a happy condition, if I could have learned the lesson of 
knowing when I was well” (213). Human beings’ instinct to roam, it seems, 
is unconquerable, making them ineligible for a tranquil utopian existence.
The question of whether people are suited to paradise is one that 
troubles utopian writing. For a perfect world would seem to require, in turn, 
perfect inhabitants, and as these texts make clear, people fall rather short 
in this regard. This problem is articulated by the Margrave de Vennes in 
Mikołaja Doświadczyńskiego przypadki in much simpler terms, as pertains to 
the difficulty of making friends:
Nie trzeba wyciągać po ludziach ostatniego stopnia doskonałości, 
bo takim sposobem nie znajdziemy żadnego, którego byśmy uznali 
 godnym naszego przywiązania; . . . [n]ie znajdziesz waszmść Nipuanów 
w Europie; musisz jednak żyć z ludźmi. . . . Mniej niedoskonały niech 
tylko będzie celem troskliwości takowej—będziesz szczęśliwym, bo 
znajdziesz przyjaciół. (163)
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(If we require the highest degree of excellence in people, we will not 
then find anyone deemed worthy of our affection. . . . There are no 
Nipuans in Europe, but you must live among people. . . . Grant a few 
imperfections in those you care to know well, and you will be happy, 
for then you will find friends. [119])
Collective existence demands compromise and a willingness to accept the 
faults of others. Reading over these words, one also thinks of poor Gulliver 
returning home from his voyages and settling into a deeply misanthropic 
existence, unable to bear even the scent of his wife and children, spending 
most of his time attempting to chat with his horses. But this speech by the 
Margrave is not simply a guide to making friends; it is also an implicit claim 
about human nature as such and the realities of collective life. A utopian 
society is one that requires “the highest degree of excellence in people”; 
conformity to a standard of perfection that humankind is incapable of.
It is noteworthy that in his speech, the Margrave draws a distinction 
between Nipuans and people. One could replace Nipuans with Houyhnhnms 
and arrive at a conclusion as to the moral that would be equally applicable 
to Gulliver’s Travels. The implication is that Nipuans and Houyhnhnms are 
a different sort of creature from humans, able to achieve a standard that 
people cannot. Indeed, it is not whim that sends Gulliver back to England 
in the final voyage of Swift’s novel; rather, it is an inadequacy of a different 
sort: he is not a Houyhnhnm. This would seem to be a further confirma-
tion of humankind’s inadequacy to utopian life, but in fact, it opens onto a 
somewhat different interpretation.
Utopia—or Else!
It is not exactly because Gulliver is not a Houyhnhnm that he cannot remain 
in their country; rather, it is because he occupies an ambiguous position in the 
organization of Houyhnhnm society. Somewhat too refined to be a Yahoo, 
he is nonetheless not a Houyhnhnm and never will be. He therefore does 
not meet the requirements to be a true citizen of Houyhnhnmland and, as 
such, becomes a threat. The Houyhnhnm assembly decrees that it is “not 
agreeable to reason or nature” (273) for him to live in a Houyhnhnm home 
as a companion and that it is dangerous for him to be placed among the 
Yahoos, for his rudimentary powers of reason could lead him to organize 
the Yahoos in rebellion. Thus, he is exhorted to leave. Rather than being a 
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claim about humankind’s qualifications (or lack thereof ) to inhabit a utopia, 
this is an example of a flaw in the utopian scheme: its inability to tolerate 
ambiguity. In a rationally ordered society, matters are black and white: there 
can be no third term.
We see manifestations of this problem in both Krasicki’s and Swift’s 
novels. The rigid organization of the utopian world makes any possibility 
of difference or change dangerous. What these works illustrate, further-
more, is the way in which anything that does not belong to the utopian 
scheme becomes wholly negative, an embodiment of evil. This is evidenced 
by the Laputans’ paranoid study of astronomy in the society encountered 
in  Gulliver’s third voyage. The Laputans fear that which they can neither 
control nor fully calculate. It is here that utopia’s totalitarianism, and violence, 
emerge.
Krasicki subtly points to the violence in the utopian scheme through the 
character of Laongo, who serves as a condensed version of all threats posed 
by otherness. Laongo, we are told, traveled to distant islands and returned 
with plans of reform. When these plans were discovered, he and his followers 
were stoned to death. A pile of rocks marks the site, and a ballad keeps its 
lessons alive for future inhabitants. Just how strongly engraved the memory 
of this primordial violence is on the minds of Nipuans is made clear when 
Xaoo, recoiling in horror at Mikołaj’s descriptions of a corrupt European 
legal system, cries “Bądźcie błogosławione, święte ręce, któreście stosami 
kamieni przywaliły Laonga i towarzyszów jego! Takich by nas zbrodni nau-
czyli wezwani od niego cudzoziemcy!” (129) (“Blessed be those sacred hands 
that crushed Laongo and his accomplices with stones! The outlanders he 
summoned would have taught us to commit the crimes you describe” [93]). 
The brutality of the language, and the matter-of-fact way in which it is 
uttered, is jarring, forcing the reader to confront the violent repression neces-
sary to any utopian scheme, its inability to tolerate dissension in any form.
It is not only explicit rebellion that Nipuans fear but innovation more 
generally—and therefore travel. Laongo’s crime is his attempt to foment 
rebellion, yet the cause is clearly located in his voyages to other countries. 
Here the problematic union of travel writing and utopian literature becomes 
clear, for while it is obvious that Mikołaj can benefit from his voyages because 
they bring him to Nipu and allow him to learn about their way of life, it is 
also apparently obvious that the Nipuans, believing they have found the ideal 
way of life, can in no way benefit from encounters with others.
Xaoo initially asks Mikołaj a series of questions, striving to find out 
as much as he can about the European way of life. Having learned about 
Mikołaj’s way of thinking, he then proceeds with his own lessons, the project 
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of “civilizing” Mikołaj. Gulliver’s Houyhnhnm master is also eager to learn 
about Europe, mostly because he is astonished to discover a Yahoo with 
some grasp of logic. He likewise, however, seems more intent on explaining 
the flaws of these systems to Gulliver than entertaining them as genuine 
alternatives. This curiosity on the part of certain utopians—surely akin to 
the caprice and wanderlust of the protagonists, albeit in a more restrained 
form—is notable, hinting as it does that travel (both to and from utopia) 
truly is a threat to their way of life. Xaoo states this explicitly, saying that 
foreign places will either be better or worse than one’s home, and if they are 
worse, what good does it do to see them, and if better, what does one gain 
from seeing them other than a newfound discontent with one’s own lot? 
Though he agrees that one may indeed learn things that will benefit one’s 
home, he claims that this will inevitably lead to the importation of foreign 
vices as well, for evil is more appealing to the weak human spirit than is 
virtue (125/90). This statement is particularly striking, for it is an implicit 
acknowledgment that humans are not naturally virtuous creatures—they 
must be disciplined in order to be good. While travel does hold out some 
possibility for improving a person, this is outweighed by its potential 
harm. There is an interesting political undertone to this argument as well: 
Xaoo argues that travel is the privilege of the wealthy, a luxury small—or 
minor—nations cannot afford. The costs are too high, and not only in 
terms of expenditure; travel also deprives society of useful members: “Im 
kraj uboższy—szkoda większa, a jeżeli nie ma w sobie takich okoliczności, 
które by do podobnych podróż zwabiały cudzoziemców—nienagrodzona” 
(125) (“The poorer a nation, the greater the costs. Moreover, if a nation has 
nothing to attract visitors, the costs are not repaid” [90]). More importantly, 
Xaoo says, travel feeds man’s restlessness rather than satisfying it, making 
it clear that a successful utopian society depends on the suppression of 
human passions in favor of a virtuous existence. It requires discipline and 
complete submission to its laws and principles. An encounter with different 
forms of life leads one to question these norms and is therefore a threat to 
the entire society.
This danger is apparent even in the highly disciplined society of the 
Houyhnhnms. Commentators on Swift such have pointed out that, in his 
willingness to play the role of host, Gulliver’s Houyhnhnm master violates 
local customs.9 Though he explicitly derides Gulliver’s beliefs, declaring 
him a “perfect Yahoo” (229), he nonetheless seems to enjoy his company 
and conversation. This suggests that he is not wholly impervious to outside 
influence. What is more, though he ultimately accedes to the assembly’s 
ruling and bids Gulliver depart, there is a trace of regret in his final words. 
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The leniency he had verged on exhibiting validates the utopian fear of 
outsiders, showing as it does that even a perfectly reasonable creature can 
become personally attached to a Yahoo.
The aberrant nature of this fondness is vividly clear when compared to 
the fate of the other Yahoos. In Houyhnhnmland, anxiety about otherness 
moves toward a terrifying extreme. Set against the race of Houyhnhnms, 
the Yahoos come to represent all that is evil, and indeed, are portrayed as 
thoroughly nasty creatures. This can be seen even in Houyhnhnm language: 
“The Houyhnhnms have no word in their language to express anything that 
is evil, except what they borrow from the deformities or ill qualities of the 
Yahoos” (269). This distinction, however, is not cast in racial terms but in 
terms of rationality: whereas the Houyhnhnms are creatures of pure reason, 
the Yahoos are bestial and irrational. The terms of the debate are set as those 
of reason itself, wholly impersonal. “So compelling is Houyhnhnm reason 
that it is presented as entirely other than force”: passionless, disinterested, 
and impermeable to argument.10 With such variables, the validity of the 
plan to exterminate the Yahoos brooks no disagreement. Even Gulliver, 
biologically kindred to them (to an extent that he develops a strong sense 
of repulsion toward himself, though self-immolation never seems to cross 
his mind), thinks nothing of using Yahoo skins and tallow to outfit his boat 
(275–76). The murder of the Yahoos is not a matter of personal distaste but 
a logical conclusion. Indeed, the Houyhnhnms “have no conception of how 
a creature can be compelled, but only advised, or exhorted; because no person 
can disobey reason without giving up his claims to be a rational creature” 
(274), and Gulliver’s master, though he hates the Yahoos, “no more blamed 
them for their odious qualities, than he did a gnnayh for its cruelty, or a 
sharp stone for cutting his hoof ” (240). In contemplating the massacre of 
the Yahoos, they are merely acting out the dictates of reason. In this final 
episode, the utopian argument is raised to its horrifying logical conclusion: 
genocide.
By defining the ideals of the Houyhnhnms as reason itself, Swift makes 
their society the essence of utopianism. The horses are faithful devotees of 
universal reason, a principle seemingly removed from any particular culture 
or location. In other words, the structure of Houyhnhnm society is theoreti-
cally a timeless, universal template. It is not only a rationally ordered world 
but also one that is structured around pure logic. By illustrating the flaws 
in this society, its inhuman face, Swift casts doubt on the utopian dream at 
large. As Seamus Deane has argued, Swift illustrates that any theorization 
of universality is always rooted in a particular time and place and is thus 
never genuinely universal.11
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Ironic Resolutions
Swift’s purpose in book 4 of Gulliver’s Travels is not to completely renounce 
reason itself. Reconstructing the claims nested in this voyage, however, is 
not so simple. Certainly, the argument is not for a wholly irrational, anarchic 
society. The satire is more open ended: it doesn’t formulate an argument so 
much as it articulates a problem, one that it cannot provide a solution for 
and perhaps one that cannot be solved. Swift simultaneously reveals the 
tyranny of reason—its tendency to slip into totalitarianism—and its poten-
tial benefits. The Houyhnhnm mode of life is not entirely disavowed or 
held up as a purely negative example. Swift insists upon the specific merits 
of this alternative vision, even as he exposes its flaws. However, unlike his 
“Modest Proposal,” which does (ironically) gesture to some legitimate steps 
for reform (for example, in paragraph 29: “Therefore, let no man talk to me 
of other Expedients: Of taxing Absentees at five Shillings a Pound: Of using 
neither Cloaths, nor Household Furniture except what is of our own Growth 
and Manufacture: Of utterly rejecting the Materials and Instruments that 
promote foreign Luxury,” etc.), no such affirmative message can be clearly 
gleaned from Gulliver’s Travels.12
The same is true of Mikołaja Doświadczyńskiego przypadki. Krasicki 
never suggests what could be changed about Nipu that might convince 
Mikołaj to stay there, nor does he ever articulate a specific critique of it as a 
place. In fact, up to the very end, Mikołaj continues to see it as perfect, but 
without ever expressing any intention of returning. Agnieszka Śniegucka has 
argued that Mikołaj’s departure from Nipu is precipitated by his realization 
that utopia makes self-realization impossible, but while one could say that 
the novel opens the possibility of such an epiphany in the reader, there is 
no evidence of any conscious awareness of this in Mikołaj.13 These novels 
illustrate, rather, that “absolute standards are unattainable by fallen man, and 
even if they could be achieved would prove unattractive and unsatisfactory. 
Moreover, all attempts at middle-ground solutions involve a certain amount 
of self-rationalization and hypocrisy”—they refuse the possibility of a middle 
way, even as they show that the extremes are unacceptable.14 Indeed, how 
can one logically map out a solution that is capable of accommodating a 
certain amount of irrationality—precisely that which cannot be understood, 
or predicted, via reason?
The problem with utopian modes of government is their attempt to map 
out an all-encompassing logical system that will apply universally. The argu-
ment these two novels make is that when theory and experience collide, the 
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results are unforeseeable. The individual cannot be fully encapsulated within 
the general except by brute conquest: the demand for freedom exceeds the 
best laid plans.
This critique is not only found in the content of these texts but is 
also performed by them. The open-ended nature of their form of satirical 
argument highlights the very blind spot of utopianism that they critique. 
Satire is not simply a different way of articulating a logical claim. It 
operates ironically, never stating its arguments openly. A utopian society, 
however, is predicated on transparency and clearly articulated premises. 
It is unable to tolerate ambiguity, which is satire’s proper residence. Satire 
is, in this way, utopian—not in the literal sense, as we have seen, but in 
the metaphorical one, for it is a curious aspect of the term “utopian” that 
its literal meaning refers to a given (fictional) place but its more popular 
metaphoric usage implies the awareness of the impossibility of such a place. 
Satire represents a kind of hope in the face of impossibility. Gesturing 
ironically to the hidden meanings behind its claims, it suggests that there 
is an ultimate resolution to the problems that it articulates, albeit one that 
cannot be simply stated. But while this kind of ironic resignation may be 
possible for an individual (or a novel), it cannot function as the basis for 
governing society.
While this lesson condemns poor hapless Gulliver to a rather unfortu-
nate ending, Mikołaj’s prospects seem rather cheerier, albeit also somewhat 
half hearted. Mikołaj returns from his travels brimming with wisdom and 
an ardent desire to apply it to the troubles that have beset Poland. Eager 
to bring about reform, he travels to Warsaw and attempts a career in 
politics, but with no success. People are unpersuaded by his arguments. 
He is surprisingly unperturbed by his failure, saying simply, “Nie udało mi 
się w Warszawie: ale ja się dlatego ani na Warszawę, ani na rodzaj ludzki 
nie gniewam. Każdy człowiek ma swój właściwy sposób myślenia; mój 
nie godził się z Warszawą, pojechałem więc myślić do Szumina” (187) (“I 
did not succeed in Warsaw, but this did not make me angry at Warsaw 
or the human race. Everyone has his own approach to things. Mine was 
not in agreement with Warsaw’s, so I went to Szumin to think” [136]). 
He returns to his estates and attempts, as much as possible, to live life in 
accordance with the Nipuan principles he has learned to value. This is a 
surprising turn in the text, an extremely anticlimactic moment: the narra-
tive momentum is completely deflated, as all the travels would seem to be 
for naught. Yet the novel concludes with an insistent note of contentment, 
albeit on a small scale. Travel has conferred benefits on Mikołaj, but they 
are of an individual, rather than collective, nature. Rather than attempting 
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to force his views on others and enact political change, he returns to his 
estates to live out his own concrete particularity. Sante Graciotti sees this 
ending as a moment when utopian ideals are confronted with reality: the 
result is not the dissolution of utopian principles but rather a shift whereby 
they are kept alive in the individual’s mind and personal life.15 Graciotti 
acknowledges that this weakens the utopian claims that the text makes 
but argues that this loss is compensated by the increase in realism. Such 
a reading, however, fails to account for the flatness of the ending. The 
sense that il faut cultiver son jardin, that there is no possibility of enticing 
the collective to pursue a better life for all, is not merely a shift but also, 
in an important sense, a failure. Though it may appear unsatisfying to 
many readers (indeed, I share Agnieszka Śniegucka’s view that the sudden 
appearance of the romance plot at the end of the novel seems obviously 
compensatory), the finale of the text is a necessary conclusion to Krasicki’s 
overarching argument and a vivid illustration of the coercive lining of 
dreams of universal freedom.16
Postcards from the Edge of Europe
In an essay on nationalism and irony, Terry Eagleton argues that it is precisely 
those who are politically oppressed under the guise of the Enlightenment’s 
notions of abstract universal equality who come to understand what such 
universalism truly represents. Universalism, he writes, must emerge from the 
particular and be consented to and internalized. In places that are politically 
oppressed, universalism will appear visibly alien, external to the individual, 
as a threat to local particularity. Upon being brutally dispossessed of their 
local culture, an oppressed group becomes alienated from itself and there-
fore poised to assume the transcendent cosmopolitan subjectivity that the 
Enlightenment allegedly represented—in order to claim their right to self-
determination. The oppressed subject begins with the perception of a lack 
that renders it non-self-identical, which opens onto a broader social dimen-
sion that poses the question of what general conditions are necessary for the 
fulfillment of their particular needs. Mediated through the general in this 
way, individual demands become relativized, transformed by an awareness of 
the particular within the general. The paradox of bourgeois Enlightenment, 
Eagleton argues, is that its universalism is enshrined in a right to particularity: 
“The only point of enjoying such universal abstract equality is to discover 
and live one’s own particular difference. The telos of the entire process is 
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not, as the Enlightenment believed, universal truth, right and identity, but 
concrete particularity.”17 To become aware of this, however, is to be forced 
into the recognition of an ironic dialectic that “cannot be lived as simple, 
seamless unity.”18 This ironic awareness is precisely what is achieved in Swift’s 
Gulliver’s Travels and Krasicki’s Mikołaja Doświadczyńskiego przypadki, albeit 
in somewhat different ways from each other.
Swift’s and Krasicki’s resistance to the utopian promise is perhaps 
less surprising when we take into account that these authors were not 
citizens of France, or Britain—the two nations with the most entrenched 
colonial enterprises and the most prodigious output of literary utopias—
but of Ireland and Poland. In 1726, when Swift was writing, Ireland was a 
colony and under the penal laws, a particularly harsh set of strictures that 
deprived Catholics (who composed roughly 80 percent of the population) 
of most of their rights. Swift, though himself a member of the ascendancy, 
was the author of a multitude of tracts and pamphlets on the Irish condi-
tion, bemoaning the system of agriculture, the consumption of imports 
instead of domestic products, the greed and corruption of landlords, and 
Ireland’s subordinate position vis-à-vis Britain. Krasicki was likewise an 
avid contributor to political debates, a cofounder of the Monitor, a news-
paper in the spirit of England’s Spectator (which Swift was a contributor 
to), which criticized Sarmatian culture and advocated for reform. The 
Monitor played an important role in bringing the intellectual currents of 
Western Europe to a Polish audience: “The names of Galileo, Descartes 
and Newton came into cultural circulation once again, and Montesquieu, 
Voltaire, Rousseau and Diderot became well known to the readers.”19 In 
1776, when Mikołaja Doświadczyńskiego przypadki was published, the Polish-
Lithuanian Commonwealth had just undergone its first partition (in 1772). 
It ceded substantial portions of Polish territory to the Prussian, Russian, 
and Austro-Hungarian empires, making the threat of political conquest far 
more visible and pressing and bringing issues of patriotism and the nation to 
the forefront (the later two partitions, in the 1790s, would wipe the Polish-
Lithuanian Commonwealth off the map entirely).20
In other words, when these novels were written, both Poland and 
Ireland were in dire straits politically, victimized by the imperial underside 
of Enlightenment discourse. That they were so oppressed is perhaps more 
obvious in the case Ireland, given the abundance of colonial discourses on 
it, but it is also clearly manifested in the fact that both Poland and Ireland 
figure heavily in travel writing of the time as barbaric outposts of civiliza-
tion.21 There is a long history of travel writing about Ireland, mostly written 
from the perspective of British visitors, many of whom were employed by 
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the British to provide reports on the territory. Amusingly enough, an earlier 
traveler, Fynes Moryson, had even compared Poland and Ireland in his 
sixteenth-century Itinerary:
In truth, myself having in Poland and Ireland found a strange 
 cheapnesse of all such necessaries, . . . this observation makes me of 
an opinion much contrary to the vulgar, that there is no more  certaine 
signe of a flourishing and rich commonwealth, then the deare price 
of these things (excepting the yeeres of famine), nor any greater 
argument of a poore and weake State, then the cheap price of them.22
Swift himself noted the entrenchment of negative stereotypes about the 
Irish: “What we call the Irish Brogue is no sooner discovered, than it makes 
the deliverer, in the last degree, ridiculous and despised; and from such a 
mouth, an Englishman expects nothing but bulls, blunders and follies.” 
He also commented on the perception of the country as a distant, savage 
sort of place: “As to Ireland, they know little more than they do of Mexico; 
further than that it is a country subject to the King of England, full of Boggs, 
inhabited by wild Irish Papists. . . . And their general opinion is, that it were 
better for England if this whole island were sunk into the sea.”23 Although 
accounts of Poland were not uniformly derogatory in nature—Warsaw was a 
glittering, decadent capital, a destination for adventurers such as Cagliostro 
or Casanova—there were enough negative anecdotes circulating to solidify 
a stereotype of Poland as a wild, uncivilized place.24 “But when one enters 
Poland, one believes one has left Europe entirely; . . . dirty villages; cottages 
little different from savage huts; everything makes one think one has been 
moved back ten centuries,” wrote one traveler.25 Indeed, as Larry Wolff 
argues, the contrast between the decadence of the nobility and the poverty 
of the peasants seemed to heighten the idea of the place as “a curious land 
of nonsense and paradox”—a land ripe for conquest.26 Poland and Ireland 
were thus forcibly positioned at the fringes of Europe, making Swift and 
Krasicki ideally poised to perceive the flaws in the dream of Enlightened 
Reason. In fact, they were both between two worlds in some sense, Swift 
living in Britain and Krasicki in Warmia (which became part of Prussia 
after the first partition), calling to mind the persistent links to exile in the 
consciousness of both cultures.27
It is important not to forget, however, that even the fringe is part of the 
whole. The point is often made in discussions of both Poland and Ireland: 
Joe Cleary mentions it in an important piece on whether Ireland can be 
considered postcolonial, and R. F. Foster likewise writes that “a glance at 
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social conditions in Ireland at the onset of the eighteenth century reveals 
that Ireland was a truly European society—both by virtue of its structure 
and because its development was constricted by factors that were general in 
Western Europe,” though he qualifies this remark by saying that “Ireland in 
1700 bore all the marks of a highly centralized European kingdom, albeit a 
kingdom that was subsidiary to the kingdom of England.”28 Similarly, Piotr 
Wandycz argues that East Central Europe should not be seen as wholly 
external to Europe and, specifically, that it should not be understood as 
having simply “imported” the Enlightenment:
Even if East Central Europe had undergone a certain  orientalization 
and turned its back on the West in the course of the seventeenth 
 century, even if Sarmatism and the “extra Hungariam non est vita” 
(there is no life outside Hungary) attitude prevailed, the region was an 
integral part of Europe. The stimuli it had received in the past, whether 
Christianity, Renaissance, Reformation, or  Counter-Reformation had 
been fully absorbed. . . . [T]he issue was not that of transplanting 
foreign and incompatible ideas, but rather of receiving and digesting 
them without risking loss of its own identity.29
Both places were part of Europe and in dialogue with Enlightenment 
theory, but their approach to those theories was also strongly informed 
by their experiences of political domination, creating a very particular 
perspective.
The effects of this paradoxical position are particularly in evidence 
in the forms of irony one finds in travelogues written by Polish and Irish 
authors. Although travel writing has been strongly linked to imperialism 
in its framing of the image of a given place as lacking in civilization and, as 
Edward Said put it, beseeching dominance, Vergil Nemoianu has argued 
that this critical equivalence betrays a certain provincialism that ignores the 
output of writers from the peripheries and how the genre of travel writing 
could serve as a resource.30 Ina Ferris has written specifically about the ways 
in which early Irish novels were in dialogue with English travel literature, 
arguing that these works frequently both recycled and parodied the tropes of 
the travelogue, and Joep Leerssen examines how these works continued the 
practice of portraying Ireland as both exotic and other.31 Krasicki and Swift 
are exemplary in this regard, evincing a clear awareness of travel literature’s 
potential for harm while also appreciating its benefits.
Alongside their abstract critiques of utopian systems, both novels 
contain more explicit reflections on their own political moment. 
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Indeed, Gulliver devotes his final pages to reflections on colonialism, 
indicting the colonial project and then exempting the British from his 
accusations in a passage in which Swift’s sarcasm overwhelms Gulliver’s 
sincerity. Swift cleverly manages to make Gulliver of two minds on the 
issue. On the one hand, he is wholly devoted to the Houyhnhnms and 
would support them should they choose to intervene in the affairs of 
Europe: “Instead of proposals for conquering that magnanimous nation,” 
he says, “I rather wish they were in a capacity or disposition to send a 
sufficient number of their inhabitants for civilizing Europe” (288). On 
the other hand, however, he argues against a British project to occupy the 
places he has visited in his other voyages, in words that would ring true 
even in a nonfictional context: “As those countries which I have described 
do not appear to have any desire of being conquered, and enslaved, or 
murdered or driven out by colonies; nor abound either in gold, silver, sugar, 
or tobacco; I did humbly conceive they were by no means proper objects 
of our zeal, our valour, or our interest” (289). Here Swift lays bare the 
fundamental drive behind the colonial enterprise, greed, and the violence 
that accompanies it. This is the most explicit moral of the text’s critique of 
colonialism, one that is easily discernible. There is a second, more potent 
one, however, that is less apparent.
The real irony of the text is that at the novel’s conclusion Gulliver can 
be read as the ideal colonial subject, a state of affairs that serves as the text’s 
most strident indictment of colonialism.32 He unquestioningly sees himself 
and those of his kind as inferior to the more “civilized” race, with a conviction 
that overturns even his familial bonds, and worships his masters to such a 
degree that he even serves their representatives in his home country, though 
they are clearly inferior to the real thing. The mute equines of England 
seem a humorous presaging of Albert Memmi’s argument that it is the 
“mediocre” colonists who remain.33 In his complete dismissal of his wife and 
children—his repulsion towards them, even—Gulliver can be seen as having 
totally internalized the structures of  (colonial) authority. His despondent 
existence is thus the logical conclusion of the colonial system: banned from 
the utopian center because of his species, he wastes away miserably at the 
periphery. And compelling as Gulliver’s explicit critique of colonialism in 
the final pages may be, it is this subtle ironic twist that serves as the more 
powerful condemnation. Swift does not use Gulliver’s own voice to articulate 
arguments against Houyhnhnm society—quite the opposite. You have to 
read Gulliver ironically to understand the point. At the same time, however, 
to read Gulliver in a purely ironic light is also not sufficient: if you dismiss 
him entirely, the force of the critique is partly lost. In other words, as in 
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Krasicki’s text, the reader is required to both identify with the protagonist 
and maintain a certain detachment from him.
Although the argument against universal reason in Swift is a general 
one, it has strong political resonances that are made clear if one focuses 
on the third section of the text, the voyage to Laputa. Barring a few 
notable exceptions, this section has been almost completely ignored by 
critical studies of the novel.34 The inhabitants of the flying island share a 
number of features with the Houyhnhnms in their rational approach to 
the world (most clearly, in their experiments with language). The satirical 
thrust of this section, however, is far more clear: it is a political allegory 
of Irish colonialism. Although the initial focus appears to be a mockery 
of Laputan abstraction, the details of the island’s functioning gradually 
shift to more explicitly political meanings. The intellectual endeavors of 
the Laputans are fueled by the labors of others: the floating island is also 
an imperial center that collects tributes from the continent below. The 
political allegory is extremely explicit here, the account of the revolt of 
Lindalino being a veiled description of the Wood’s half-pence affair, which 
Swift also wrote about in The Drapier’s Letters. What is at the forefront 
of this account is the tenuous position of the colonizing force: their 
threats of extermination are not actually feasible, for to crush the town 
would destroy the island. And when the townspeople call the king’s bluff, 
he is forced to submit. The penultimate sentence of the chapter carries 
a veiled warning: “I was assured by a great minister that if the island had 
descended so near the town as not to be able to raise itself, the citizens 
were determined to fix it forever, to kill the king and all his servants, and 
entirely change the government” (164). The episode is related without 
commentary: its implications would have been obvious enough to Swift’s 
contemporaries. The use of satire is more familiar here: it serves in its 
more typical role of permitting the author to state ironically what would 
be politically unacceptable if asserted outright.
Gulliver’s travels in the metropolis Lagado, the realm below the island, 
have further resonances in an Irish context. Gulliver notes the poor state 
of agriculture in Lagado and learns that this is a result of political reforms 
instituted by people inspired by Laputan theory: “About 40 years ago certain 
persons went up to Laputa, either upon business or diversion, and after 
5 months continuance came back with a very little smattering in mathematics, 
but full of volatile spirits acquired in that airy region” (169). Gulliver’s host, 
Lord Munodi, is considered a kind of well-meaning imbecile who insists 
on clinging to the old ways, a sign of his backwardness. This is a clear 
reference to politics of Swift’s time. Nicholas Canny describes the way that 
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British landowners expanded tillage farming and introduced technological 
 innovations into eighteenth-century Irish agriculture, noting that native 
landowners would often follow suit:
While the changing character of the physical environment was closely 
related to the spread of British landowners and settlers, it was not 
completely dependent upon this factor. Native proprietors also saw 
the need to promote innovation, both because they wanted to be 
considered worthy subjects of the Crown and because innovation 
could add to their wealth.35
This situation gives rise to Swift’s more explicitly political writings, in which 
he castigates the mismanagement of Irish land and argues that Ireland is 
capable of supporting four times its current population, claiming that as 
a result of flawed rule, “Ireland is the poorest of all civilized countries in 
Europe, with every natural advantage to make it one of the richest.”36 This 
is not a critique of the tyranny of reason so much as its blind stupidity and 
inefficiency: those who are wedded to theory lose sight of the tangible 
purpose it was initially meant to serve.
The final portion of this section, which describes the Academy of 
Lagado, makes this danger of theory even more clear. When read as political 
allegory, what would seem to be its absurdist humor becomes a pointed 
critique of the dangers of ruling people by abstractions. Gulliver visits the 
academies erected by reformers and finds them attempting to build houses 
from the roof down and constructing machines to transform feces into 
food. The satire here is so exaggerated that its humor softens, perhaps, its 
ferocious bite. It is nonetheless a powerful attack on political rule from afar. 
Indeed, Declan Kiberd argues that one of the most radical moments in the 
text is “the implication that Balnibari has been martyred not to political 
hatred but to demented, misplaced theory. . . . Out of touch with reality, 
[the Laputans’] ruling elites feel free to weave crazy administrative fantasies. 
Balnibari is sufficiently distant for them to feel no need to check the theo-
ries against human experience: hence its ruinous condition.”37 The intellect 
concocts ever more bizarre schemes for the organization of human life: its 
power unchecked, it runs headlong into ruin. The absurd satire of the work 
may muffle its political undertones, but they are nonetheless vividly present.
Thus, what initially appears to be a fanciful fiction of a strange island 
ruled by theory comes to be seen as an allegory of Britain itself. Although 
critics have largely overlooked the third voyage, it serves two important 
purposes. Firstly, it lays the groundwork for the final voyage and the 
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 reflections on Houyhnhnmland, doing much of the explanatory work for 
various aspects of their society, such as their language. Secondly, however, 
it grounds these abstract arguments in a real world context, indicating to 
readers that the subsequent depictions of talking horses may have more 
relevance to their lives than they might have thought.
The first section of Mikołaja Doświadczyńskiego przypadki explicitly 
discusses Poland, offering a satirical view of Sarmatism and its impact on 
Polish society. While there are some positive aspects in the portrayal of 
Sarmatism, as Krystyna Stasiewicz has pointed out, Krasicki relentlessly 
mocks the backwardness and superficiality of Polish society, its mindless 
adoption of foreign fashions, and hopelessly corrupt and mismanaged legal 
and educational systems.38 But if the opening of the novel is a satire of Polish 
Sarmatian society as it existed then, the Nipuan section can be read as a 
satire of what it imagined itself to be. What appears as the Nipuans’ humble 
resignation to their own lot is a clear castigation of Polish insularity, and the 
Nipuan love of agriculture weds conventions of utopian literature (which 
often privileges such simple forms of existence: the Houyhnhnms, for 
example, share this trait) with the pastoral tradition in Polish writing. This, 
however, is a somewhat subtle use of satire. The more explicit reflections 
on colonialism are to be found in the sections that take place in America.
The supposedly utopian New World, where Mikołaj arrives as a slave 
sent to work in the mines, conjures up thoughts of hell rather than paradise, 
particularly in the repeatedly subterranean imagery; the bowels of the ship, 
the depths of the caves, and so forth. When he befriends a Native American 
and describes Nipu to him, the man’s response is that it must certainly have 
been founded by his early forefathers fleeing from colonialism. Whether or 
not this is the case, he says, it is clear that the Nipuans embody the principles 
of early American society before the arrival of the Spanish (152/111). Krasicki 
here contrasts colonialism and utopian aspirations: the Spaniards are not 
attempting to create a better world; instead, their sole motive is greed. The 
critique is carried further with descriptions of slavery’s atrocities and its 
inhuman treatment of people. The New World, after an encounter with the 
Europeans, is a nightmarish sort of place: the quest for the perfect society 
is a project for its exiles.
Krasicki thereby again reiterates his critique of “savagery” and the polit-
ical uses such judgments are marshaled toward. After his experiences in the 
New World, Mikołaj, who is pushed to question his own assumptions about 
how civilized the people he encounters are throughout the novel, seems on the 
verge of simply reversing his previous conceptions and seeing the  Europeans as 
brutal and Nipuans as perfect. Here again the Margrave de Vennes  intercedes, 
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noting that even among the seemingly perfect Nipuans, “i tam znaleźli się 
tacy, których musiano ukamieniować” (163) (“there have been men who had 
to be stoned” [118–19]). This corrective hints at the larger problems of Nipuan 
society—which Mikołaj remains unconscious of—but also reinforces the text’s 
ultimate argument about cultural relativism. To simply reverse the terms and 
see the Europeans as savage and Nipuans as civilized is not sufficient. Rather, 
it is the dichotomy itself that must be amended.
These more explicit political interventions remind us that these authors 
are not idly engaging in abstract speculation. They are a reminder that for 
both Swift and Krasicki, there were concrete stakes in the fictional explora-
tion of these philosophical questions. While their novels should not simply 
be reduced to the historical conditions of their origins, it is undeniable that 
those local contexts informed their works in meaningful ways.
Conclusion
Utopian literature is meant to be an embodiment of a philosophical argument 
that also serves as a necessary corollary to it. If the ideas are sound, then one 
should be able to put them into practice, and fiction is a means of doing so. 
These novels, however, do precisely the opposite: they show that it is in their 
embodiment that the ideas of utopian society are revealed as untenable. Lived 
reality, rather than neatly embodying the abstract, has an unfortunate tendency 
to exceed or contradict it. Irony ultimately deals the death blow to utopianism, 
for the clearly reasoned tenets of utopian society prove unable to countenance 
irony, the playground of human caprice and thus the locus of freedom.
Moreover, it is through fiction that the true limitations of the utopian 
project can emerge. Although literature would seem to provide a unique 
opportunity to make the utopian argument in a different way, through 
vicarious experience rather than reasoned discourse, the paradox of travel 
literature reveals the contradiction inherent in this approach, namely, the 
use of literature to bestow experience that the text insists that words cannot 
convey. Nonetheless, these novels do impart certain philosophical lessons 
to their readers, precisely through their portrayal of protagonists who fail 
to learn. The argument made by these books depends on a blend of irony 
and identification, revealing the limitations of straightforward realism for 
political critique. These novels simultaneously show the problems that beset 
fiction’s efforts to persuade and illustrate fiction’s unique capabilities to use 
irony to reveal those problems. It is precisely because these authors were 
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writing from the peripheries of Europe, in nations that had been oppressed 
under the auspices of universal values, that they were uniquely primed to 
perceive the paradox inherent in the promises of the Enlightenment. Their 
novels masterfully illuminate these ironies, measuring the distance between 
center and periphery, home and paradise.
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